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Kant 
It has become an overused cliché to describe a philosopher as the most 
significant since Plato, but there is perhaps no better pretender to the throne 
than Immanuel Kant (1725-1804). The guiding theme of Kant’s philosophical 
project was the problem of objective knowledge: he wanted to overcome what he 
saw as the errors in both rationalism and empiricism whilst preserving their true 
insights.  For him, neither experience nor reason alone could adequately provide 
a basis for knowledge.  He himself described his thought as a “Copernican 
Revolution” in that the appearance of an object has to be understood as a 
product of the activity of the subject, but whereas Copernicus’s astronomy took 
man out of the centre of the universe, Kant’s philosophy placed the knowing 
subject right at the heart of his system. 
 
Kant’s philosophical career was due more to chance than design; two contingent 
incidents determined his path rather than free choice.  First, as the fourth child 
of nine in a poor family in the Prussian town of Königsberg (renamed Kaliningrad 
by Stalin), he had to rely on the benevolence of a local pastor who recognised his 
undoubted intelligence and arranged for a scholarship at a Pietist school.  
Second, he could so easily have been a professor in mathematics or natural 
science, but was offered the Chair in Logic and Metaphysics by his local 
university in 1770.  Kant passed his whole life in Königsberg, entering the 
university there at sixteen and leaving six years later to begin working as a 
private tutor.  He obtained his first – unsalaried – post when he was 31 and his 
lectures were very well attended.  By this time, he had already published works 
on dynamics and mathematics, but once installed in his chair his sense of duty 
drove him to concentrate solely on philosophy.   
 
Kant remained unmarried, although he twice considered it, and his private life 
was notoriously uneventful; his Pietist upbringing installing in him a sense of 
duty and routine which was parodied by Heine’s remark that the housewives of 
Königsberg would set their clocks by Kant’s daily walk.  Politically, he was no 
radical – once promising the King of Prussia to cease writing on matters of 
religion in case his thought was seen as subversive – but he sympathised with 
both the American and French revolutions and also the political thought of 
Rousseau.  However, it was not his life, but his thought which would carve his 
place in history. 
 
The works of Kant were initially concerned with natural philosophy and 
mathematics and these publications won him a great reputation in academic 
circles.  It was, however, after a period of relative silence that his greatest work 
appeared.  The Critique of Pure of Reason was first published in 1781, the product 
of twelve years of careful reflection, but five months hurried writing.  Due to this 
Kant attempted to clarify some of the ideas in the Prologemona to Every Future 
Metaphysic  in 1783 and rewrote parts of the Critique for its second edition in 
1787. His major works on morality, The Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals 
and The Critique of Practical Reason, appeared in 1785 and 1788 respectively.  
The final Critique of Judgement, the less well known of the three was published in 
1790 and revised in 1793. 
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Epistemology 
Kant’s mature philosophical project began with the consideration of the problem 
of reality or, put more precisely, how it is possible for a subject to have objective 
knowledge.  Kant, schooled and immersed in a tradition of Leibnizian rationalism, 
was to be awoken from his “dogmatic slumbers” through the influence of Hume’s 
empiricism.  Rationalism held that all knowledge could be derived from the 
exercise of reason alone because the human mind was able to intuit the rational 
order of things, whereas empiricism argued that all knowledge comes to the 
subject through experience and therefore knowledge claims were generated by 
things impinging on our senses and causing perceptions.  Kant, however, was 
aware of a certain gap in both epistemological accounts: what is it specifically 
about the human mind which means that its representations happen to map 
snugly on to reality?  In other words, why do we assume that there is an 
unquestionable harmony between reality and our representation of it? 
 
His response to this was the Critical Philosophy, or the attempt to synthesise the 
seemingly contradictory claims of rationalism and empiricism.  For Kant, 
judgements are either analytic, that is the negation of this judgement will involve 
a contradiction (“a bachelor is male”) or synthetic, that is they join two concepts 
together in order to form a new item of knowledge (“the table is round”).  
Judgements are also either a priori, that is not derived from experience, or a 
posteriori, that is derived from experience.  Hume supposed that the distinctions 
were the same and that all analytic judgements are a priori and all synthetic 
judgements are a posteriori, thus the only way the subject can know things that 
are not definitions or tautologies is via experience.  Kant was unhappy with this 
for the simple reason that, according to him, there exist three classes of 
judgements: analytic a priori; synthetic a posteriori; and, in contradiction of 
Hume, synthetic a priori.  These judgements are most readily employed in 
mathematics, scientific statements such as “every event has a cause” and moral 
judgements. Kant’s argument for this consists in showing that an analytic a priori 
statement such as “A bachelor is male” is a simple tautology, whereas with 
“5+7=12”, the concept 5+7 only states the idea that five and seven are to be 
united but says nothing about what that new concept will be.  (This view of 
mathematics would be criticised by Frege.)  Similarly, the idea of event does not 
contain the concept of cause and one cannot experience all events, therefore the 
statement “every event has a cause” is synthetic but derived from reason and not 
experience.  Synthetic a priori judgements allow the subject to make objective 
judgements about the world; that is, judgements which are true for all rational 
beings and not just true for the subject having the experience. 
 
The aim of Kant’s first critique was twofold: to demonstrate that synthetic a priori 
knowledge is possible (which Hume’s empiricism denied) and to examine the 
claims of metaphysics, demonstrating that reason employed without any input 
from experience will lead to illusion.  The book itself is split into three main parts, 
each corresponding to a different faculty or power of reason: the Aesthetic is 
concerned with how the subject can have knowledge of objects of experience; the 
Analytic concentrates on the conceptual elements of reasoning and how the 
subject forms synthetic a priori judgements; and finally, the Dialectic wants to 
discover the boundaries of the subject’s possible knowledge and demonstrate that 
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transcendental knowledge of reality as it is in itself (the thing-in-itself or 
noumenon) is impossible. 
 
Rather than trace the arguments of the first critique, in such a brief account it 
would be more pertinent to sketch Kant’s basic epistemological position.  It can 
perhaps be best summarised by his own words in that “Thoughts without 
concepts are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.”  In other words, 
contrary to the rationalist, knowledge cannot depend on reason alone, since the 
concepts of the mind need to be applied to intuitions (Anschauung) otherwise – as 
he shows in the Dialectic – it is possible to generate two valid arguments starting 
from the same premise whose conclusions are contradictory.  Put simply, 
intuitions are necessary to constrain thought processes.  Similarly, contrary to 
the empiricist, knowledge cannot depend on experience alone, otherwise synthetic 
a priori judgements would not be possible and no judgement could be objectively 
true.   
 
The solution which Kant offers is that of the transcendental idealist: the knowing 
mind has a certain structure that makes it possible for the subject to make 
judgements from the intuitions given to it by reality.  A useful – though ultimately 
unsatisfying analogy – is to describe a subject who has impaired sight and can 
only have (visual) experience when he is given a pair of glasses to wear.  For him 
to have any experience at all, he must wear the glasses, but unfortunately the 
lenses of these glasses are tinted pink.  Without the glasses, he can have no 
experience, but with the glasses his experience is influenced by a factor which 
does not belong to the object itself.  For Kant, human reason plays the same role 
as the glasses: it is impossible to have any experience at all without applying 
certain a priori categories to that experience, categories which belong to the 
knowing subject and not the object.  Kant’s epistemology, therefore, consists of 
transcendental arguments: given that one has the experience ‘x’, what a priori 
concepts make it possible for one to experience x? 
 
The best way in which to comprehend Kant’s transcendental idealism is to divide 
reason into its three moments: one, the faculty of intuition receives a manifold of 
intuition, that is intuitions unified by their appearance in space and time; two, 
the faculty of imagination reproduces (schematises) the object of experience for 
the faculty of understanding; and, three, the faculty of understanding applies the 
proper concepts to the object in order to form a judgement.  Thus, it is firstly 
necessary that intuitions be given in space and time; the “pure intuitions” as 
Kant calls them because they are not concepts but are produced by the knowing 
subject and not from reality itself.  For this object to become an object of thought, 
it must be rendered explicable in conceptual terms, thus the correct concepts 
must be applied to it.  Kant then asks himself: what are these a priori concepts 
by virtue of which objects of experience are constituted?  By interrogating the 
judgements of the mind, Kant was able to list the twelve pure concepts (divided 
into four categories) involved in making judgements:  
 the category of quantity: unity, plurality, totality;  
 the category of quality: reality, negation, limitation;  
 the category of relation: inherence-and-subsistence; causality-and-
dependence, reciprocity;  
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 and the category of modality: possibility, existence and necessity-and-
contingency. 
These fundamental concepts make it possible for the knowing subject to form 
judgements because without them he would be unable to know anything at all.  
Synthetic a priori judgements are only possible according to Kant because the 
knowing subject can apply the categories to the a priori contents as well as the 
empirical contents of the mind. 
 
Kant’s transcendental idealism commits him to assuming that objects are 
empirically real in that they are true for any rational being who employs the 
categories of understanding.  This means that science is not affected by his 
idealism and neither is knowledge at an everyday level since judgements can be 
objectively true for every rational being.  However, objects are transcendentally 
ideal, that is it is impossible to say anything of reality independent of the human 
mind, since that is beyond our powers of knowing.  Having demonstrated that the 
empiricist who believes the knowing subject to be passive is unable to explain 
how our subjective representations agree with each other in this objective sense, 
Kant now turns his attention, in the Dialectic, to the rationalist where he shows 
that speculative metaphysics, that is the use of reason without it being 
constrained by intuitions, leads to false or, at best, indefensible positions. 
Transcendental illusion results when principles not meant for use outside 
experience are used as if they were.  Concepts need to be constrained by 
intuitions and are only applicable if they can be judged in accordance with those 
outside objects.  Sensibility (the faculty of intuition) is this constraining 
restriction and without this constraint reason can go wild.  Kant demonstrates 
this with regard to three very specific metaphysical problems: the Idea of the soul, 
the Idea of cosmology and the Idea of God.  His conclusion might seem to favour a 
reduction of metaphysics to matters of science, but his aim is quite different in 
that the Ideas of reason are concepts which it is right for us to have (given our 
subjective constitution) but which there is no scope for employing in forming 
judgements.  Unlike, say, causality, the Idea of human freedom or God is not 
used to constitute a judgement, but they regulate the free use of reason so that 
the knowing subject aims at truth and full explanation.  It was to these ideas that 
Kant’s moral philosophy was to return. 
Ethics 
Given Kant’s admiration for the Newtonian view of the universe, he immediately 
saw a problem for moral philosophy.  If the whole universe is determined and the 
agent and his actions are part of that universe, then the human subject cannot 
be responsible for his own actions because they are merely the result of natural 
causation.  The distinction between the transcendentally ideal and the empirically 
real again plays a part in Kant’s moral theory which was elaborated in the 
Groundwork and the second critique. 
 
It is beyond our cognitive powers to state that the universe is wholly determined 
since causality is a concept the subject applies to intuitions, a concept without 
which he or she would be unable to represent objects in the understanding.  
Objects and agents, then, are phenomenally subjects of natural causation, but 
noumenally it is impossible to say whether human agents are free or determined. 
Kant believes that the Idea of freedom is a regulative concept for moral action: 
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agents do not know what their freedom consists in, but they know they are free 
because they are moral agents.  With theoretical knowledge, the categories of 
reason constituted the object of thought.  What, then, is required for the agent to 
be able to formulate objective practical principles, that is synthetic a priori 
judgements that do not represent what is the case, but what ought to be the 
case?  Kant’s answer was that the Idea of freedom regulates and makes possible 
moral judgements.  To make moral judgements about what ought to be, the 
knowing subject must presuppose that agents are free or autonomous. 
 
Kant is interested in the reason for an action: if an action is caused by processes 
in the phenomenal world, including desires and passions, it is not free and 
therefore morally without worth.  This is a description of action which is apt only 
for theoretical knowledge.  Hypothetical imperatives or intentions which depend 
on the particularity of the agent can have a reason for action, but not an objective 
one since it applies only to that agent at that time. The only actions which have 
moral worth are those freely performed and arising from a maxim (the underlying 
principle which justifies the particular intention) which is in conformity with the 
moral law.  The idea of freedom allows Kant to deduce what then constitutes a 
free, objectively binding maxim: the maxim of my action conforms to the moral 
law if and only if I can will it to become a universal law.  By willing it to be a 
universal law, I claim for it an objectivity as a duty for all rational beings because 
it does not depend on my identity, culture or situation, but is equally applicable 
to all rational beings. 
 
These duties which should determine the behaviour of all rational beings are, 
depending on the specific interpretation of Kant’s words, either generated by, 
derived from, or tested by the formula for universal law.  Kant offers three 
differing formulations of the moral law and it is debatable whether at times he is 
trying to reformulate or add to it, but the overarching aim of his moral theory is 
to justify an objective morality which is true for all rational beings based on the 
Idea of freedom. 
The Critique of Judgement 
Kant’s final critique seemingly has various themes which leads to some confusion 
concerning his overarching aim.  On one level, Kant wants to show that the 
scientific project is regulated by the Ideas of reason; that is, the desire to offer an 
ultimate explanation of the universe is motivated by the regulative concepts of 
reason.  On another level, the book is a work of aesthetics concerned with the 
problem of beauty in so far as aesthetic judgements are an expression of 
subjective opinion but also claim universal assent.  In other words, if one’s 
aesthetic pleasure depends solely on the particular agent, how is it possible that 
it can be a judgement in Kant’s robust sense of that word?  The answer was, not 
surprisingly, that aesthetic judgements were synthetic a priori: the judgement of 
beauty is based in pleasure but this pleasure ought to be universally valid.  For 
Kant, aesthetic judgement became the paradigmatic example of the faculty of 
imagination because it reflects the process of systemisation of intuitions into 
conceptual objects.  However, since the object conceptualised is not dependent on 
a purely impersonal, rational being, the imagination engages in “free play” and 
rejoices in its own creative power.  The subject is pleased by beauty not because 
of a property belonging to the object, but because he experiences the harmonious 
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working of his rational faculties and his power to project that harmony on the 
world.  The final section of the work interrogates the concept of purpose and its 
scientific validity. 
 
Kant’s influence was to dominate, firstly, German philosophy in the reactions of 
the subjective idealists (Fichte and Schelling) who took Kantian philosophy one 
step further by rejecting the role of the thing-in-itself.  Reality was, for them, 
purely the product of mental activity.  It is also certain that without Kant, there 
would be no Hegel and his absolute idealism and it is perhaps arguable that 
philosophy in the twentieth century would not be as it is without the man from 
Königsberg. 
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